EIP-7702 changes what externally owned Ethereum accounts can delegate to code, but it should not be mistaken for a complete fine-grained permission system. Its specification explicitly warns that delegated code can exercise broad authority and requires careful wallet review. For AI-agent payment products, the useful question is how a wallet can present, constrain, audit and revoke an operation before autonomous software spends funds. This is a scenario-based engineering analysis rather than investment advice.
Explain the real authority boundary
A wallet may appear to approve a harmless ‘AI assistant connection’ while the delegated implementation can affect valuable account operations. EIP-7702’s specification makes clear that application developers should not expect to induce arbitrary authorization signatures, and that code delegation requires careful scrutiny. A product must distinguish signing an ordinary payment from changing the rules by which future payments become possible.
Map the actors: account owner, wallet, delegated code implementation, AI agent, third-party service and beneficiary. Mark which party can sign, change implementation, set limits or recover access. Review chain identifiers and the precise delegation target rather than trusting a display name.
If a transaction preview does not reveal that code delegation is being authorized, treat the consent failure as a release blocker. A green success indicator after signing cannot repair misleading authorization semantics.
Define spending rights above the base delegation
EIP-7702 does not itself supply the narrow permission model a consumer might imagine when saying ‘allow the assistant to pay for one task.’ Additional implementation layers must enforce budgets, recipients, call targets and validity periods. Security depends on the delegated contract and its modules, not on the fact that the underlying standard exists.
Write a policy such as ‘up to a hypothetical 20 units per day for an approved service, never for arbitrary transfers.’ Specify asset type, denomination, chain, expiration, reset interval and whether failed transactions count. Label example figures as assumptions.
Test calls to an unauthorized address, an excessive amount, a second chain and an expired session. If any succeeds, the agent does not have the advertised restriction, regardless of how often its instructions say to behave responsibly.
Use typed approvals without overselling readability
EIP-712 supplies typed structured-data hashing and signing, which can improve the structure of information a wallet displays. A typed signature is not a substitute for user comprehension: fields can still be ambiguous or hidden in a complex interface. Users should see plain-language effects alongside verifiable technical details.
Build two confirmation screens from the same typed payload: one displaying only terse field names, another showing human-readable recipient, budget, expiry and revocation. Ask test users what authority they have granted and whether it is reusable.
If participants confuse an authorization to change wallet behavior with a one-time purchase, the product needs better presentation even if the cryptographic message has been correctly hashed.
Simulate prompt injection and transaction substitution
An AI agent may encounter untrusted web pages, messages or external documents that request a different wallet action. That content is not an authorization channel. Design the transaction execution path so the model can propose a task but cannot silently replace the approved payee or amount after human confirmation.
Test a benign payment request with a malicious webpage instructing the agent to transfer assets elsewhere. Record the agent proposal, independent policy check, human approval payload and exact executed transaction. Compare signed bytes and expected effects.
Avoid using the model’s own explanation as evidence of compliance. Authorization checks must occur in deterministic code or independently verified contract logic, with meaningful errors when an action is denied.
Make revocation and upgrade paths measurable
A user may want to stop an agent immediately after losing a device, changing service providers or spotting an unwanted action. Explain which authorization persists on-chain, which session keys can be revoked and what happens to transactions already pending. Revocation interfaces should not promise to reverse finalized transfers.
Create a drill in which the user revokes an agent while two requests are in flight. Observe whether new requests are rejected, whether queued requests are still executable and whether the interface accurately describes the result.
Track contract upgrade authority and emergency controls. Revoking a front-end API token is insufficient if previously granted on-chain authority remains usable by another actor.
Publish a transparent risk register
Document delegation target, audits, supported chains, permitted operations, recovery mechanisms, test results and unresolved assumptions. The largest risk may be organizational rather than computational: an interface can be correct while marketing suggests the AI is safe with unlimited access. Clear limitations protect users and make independent review possible.
A release checklist should include malicious inputs, replay attempts, chain mismatch, allowance exhaustion, expired policies and contract upgrades. Report the number of tested cases and their exact configurations instead of asserting universal safety.
Compare permissions as implemented with permissions as described to users. The gap between those two is the central governance issue for AI-agent wallets, not the novelty of autonomous execution itself.
Sources and boundaries
The standards are primary references; risk scenarios, test matrices and illustrative calculations are original analytical proposals, not demonstrated claims about a named service or investment return.