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EIP-7702 lets an externally owned Ethereum account delegate execution to contract code while retaining its familiar address. This creates new possibilities for smart spending policies and batched transactions, but it also creates an unusual security challenge: the address looks familiar even when its execution behavior has changed. A user who sees an apparently routine wallet approval may not understand that subsequent calls can follow newly delegated logic. The safest agent integration therefore needs a visible code-delegation state, explicit spending boundaries and independent recovery controls before a convenience-focused onboarding screen is built.
Understand what authorization installs
Created in May 2024 and deployed to Ethereum mainnet with Pectra in May 2025, EIP-7702 introduces a transaction type containing authorization tuples. The tuple binds fields such as chain ID, implementation address, nonce and signature. A successful authorization writes a delegation indicator pointing to code that can govern the externally owned account’s behavior. This is not merely an ordinary one-time payment message.
The delegation indicator persists until changed through an authorized mechanism. A developer should not claim that the core EIP automatically grants temporary keys or a daily budget. Those are policies that the delegated implementation may choose to provide and must be tested separately.
At the approval screen, show the code destination, target network, whether control persists and how it can be revoked. Explain the effect in ordinary language instead of hiding it behind a generic optimization or faster-payments label.
Specify session permissions independently
A delegated account can support sessions with scoped authority, but their safety depends on its code and configuration. List allowed contract destinations, function selectors, token types, maximum amount per operation, aggregate spending cap, permitted time window and emergency-stop rights. Reject all unspecified actions by default. Unknown tool results should never silently expand the allowlist.
This separation matters because an AI agent may encounter prompt injection or an untrusted external service. A deceptive instruction in a web page or tool output should not be able to move funds outside the signed policy. Confirm the permission checks by simulating hostile tool responses.
Document whether a session credential can itself change permissions, rotate signers or revoke the parent account’s delegated code. Those powers should not be implied from a single successful transfer test.
Plan revocation as more than a button
Users need to distinguish disabling the current AI session, revoking a session key, replacing delegated code and canceling outstanding allowances or off-chain orders. Those operations can have different state transitions and fees. Removing one key may leave code delegation in place, while changing delegation may leave contracts holding previously granted allowances.
Build an account status view that displays active code implementation, pending transactions, session budgets and known approvals. Provide instructions for emergency recovery even if the agent application is unavailable or compromised. Simulate a lost device, compromised session key and failed revocation broadcast.
A helpful support article should say which changes take effect on-chain, what remains effective until confirmation and which external services must be contacted separately. Avoid promises that one tap erases every downstream authorization.
Bound replay risk on all transaction layers
EIP-7702 authorization tuples incorporate chain-related fields and nonces, but external business orders can still have their own replay surfaces. EIP-712 defines typed structured data but does not automatically enforce one-time consumption. If a delegated agent buys API services using separately signed orders, the purchase verifier must track order IDs, spending consumption and expiry independently.
Test a copied authorization on an unexpected chain, a duplicated service order, two relayers racing and a seller attempting to change the settlement address. The desired outcome is an enforceable aggregate budget and an auditable rejected replay, not merely a cryptographic signature that validates.
An account can legitimately sign multiple permissions at different times. Track their cumulative effects so the user does not mistakenly read every individual per-transaction cap as a total spending cap.
Audit upgrade and code ownership risks
Before approving a delegated implementation, examine whether it is upgradeable and who can change it. An upgrade can alter behavior while the account address stays unchanged, and sometimes while the user-facing wallet interface still looks ordinary. Record implementation hashes or trustworthy release references, permission model assumptions and independent review scope.
Introduce explicit approval for authority-expanding upgrades. Require a regression suite covering unauthorized spending, signer rotation, role boundaries and code removal. Monitor unexpected state changes and ensure the product can stop requesting new transactions without relying solely on the same compromised service.
The security review should document what was actually examined. A general statement that a wallet is audited does not mean every connected AI tool, service contract and version of a delegate implementation received equivalent scrutiny.
Use user comprehension as a release metric
Measure whether people can explain what they delegated, where spending is permitted and how to stop it. Also track unauthorized-call rejection, transaction reversions, recovery time and customer support interventions. Compare with a conventional wallet flow on identical tasks and risk levels rather than using a highly polished delegation demo as the entire baseline.
Keep transaction receipts and approval histories clear about code state and commercial intent. A user should be able to inspect both on-chain and app-layer spending limits without deciphering raw bytecode. For risky operations, manual confirmation remains a valid design choice even when the agent can automate the transaction technically.
EIP-7702 is an important account capability, not a free safety guarantee. The durable product advantage comes from bounded authority, reliable recovery and a legible audit trail that survives wallet and tool changes.
